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“Pay What You Want” as Threshold Public Good Provision 
 
Abstract 
Prevailing wisdom on “pay what you want” (PWYW) pricing focuses on the influence of 
altruism or fairness on consumers’ payments. In this paper, we offer a different perspective by 
demonstrating that, if the seller and consumers interact repeatedly, and future provision of 
PWYW depends on whether current revenue under PWYW is sufficient for the seller to achieve 
financial goals, then paying under PWYW can be likened to paying for a threshold public good. 
Our model implies that continuous provision of PWYW can be profitable even when all 
consumers are self-interested. We find in two experiments that if there is pre-payment online 
chat-room-style communication among consumers, then efficient tacit coordination at the 
payment stage can be accomplished to achieve continuous PWYW provision. We also show 
experimentally that pre-payment communication can sustain PWYW provision even when 
consumers have limited feedback about each other’s payments, or limited information about the 
market. 
 
Keywords: pay what you want; pay as you wish; threshold public goods; social dilemma; 
communication; feedback; market information
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“Pay What You Want” as Threshold Public Good Provision 
 
In a recent post on the Wikimedia Foundation website, Jimmy Wales, co-founder of 
Wikipedia, pleaded with users to donate to the website so that Wikipedia would not have to raise 
revenues through advertising. He wrote: “Commerce is fine. Advertising is not evil. But it 
doesn’t belong here. Not in Wikipedia.”1 Wales has repeatedly made similar pleas to users for 
years, so as to assure that the website is financially sustained by users’ donations. In effect, 
Wikipedia has survived by means of a “pay what you want” (PWYW) pricing policy, under 
which every user donates any amount they want (including nothing) for Wikipedia’s products. 
Wales’ message underscores the argument that user donations help “keep Wikipedia free”. 
Sufficient donations would sustain Wikipedia’s PWYW model in the future, but if donations did 
not reach sufficiency, Wikipedia might have to charge users a subscription fee that would 
potentially be higher than the donation solicited; or Wikipedia might have to accept 
advertisements, an action that could reduce users’ future benefits because Wikipedia’s pursuit of 
advertising revenue might adversely impact their real or perceived objectivity. This argument, 
apparently, has persuaded many users to pay Wikipedia, despite the fact that they could have 
paid nothing while consuming the website’s content. In fact, the website has essentially become 
a public good with associated free riding issues, as the PWYW policy makes the website’s 
content available to all users for free, and excludes no user.  
The prevailing wisdom in the literature on PWYW focuses on how consumers’ sense of 
altruism or of fairness towards the seller might influence their payments (e.g., Gneezy, Gneezy, 
Nelson, & Brown, 2010). We offer a different perspective by demonstrating that PWYW can 
transform a private good (e.g., the content of Wikipedia) into a public good by effectively 
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making it non-excludable and non-rivalrous. If (1) there are repeated interactions between the 
seller (e.g., the Wikimedia Foundation) and its customers (users of Wikipedia), and (2) future 
provision of PWYW depends on whether current revenue under PWYW is sufficiently large for 
the seller to achieve financial goals, then consumers paying under PWYW can be likened to 
paying for the future provision of a threshold or step-level public good (see e.g., van der Kragt, 
Orbell, & Dawes, 1983; Croson & Marks, 2000). The Wikipedia example highlights this 
perspective, which underpins the core thesis of our paper. By means of a simple model, we show 
that, theoretically, continuous provision of PWYW could be profitable to the seller even when all 
consumers are purely self-interested. This theoretical implication therefore augments the extant 
literature on PWYW, which has been primarily focused on fairness or altruistic motives towards 
the seller. Our experiments provide further empirical evidence for the theoretical implication. 
Like most other threshold public good models, our model allows for two types of 
equilibrium outcomes: a socially inferior outcome in which no consumer pays, and a set of 
socially efficient outcomes in which consumers coordinate tacitly to attain a high level of 
PWYW (the “public good”) provision. As such, it has the characteristics of a social dilemma in a 
general sense (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). A major objective of our study 
is to identify behavioral conditions that can sustain tacit coordination in the social dilemma 
manifested in our model. We found one such condition in our Experiment 1: if there is online 
chat-room-style communication among consumers prior to paying, then tacit coordination at the 
payment stage can be accomplished to achieve continuous provision of PWYW. Such long-term 
provision of PWYW is generally an efficient outcome for the seller and for consumers. That is, 
cooperative equilibria in our PWYW situations can be sustained through communication. It 
needs be emphasized that, as the chat log of our experimental subjects indicate, those equilibria 
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were sustained in the absence of fairness or altruistic motives towards the seller (cf. the Thick 
description in that experiment’s Analysis and Results section). 
In addition, our experimental results suggest that communication facilitates coordination 
by fostering social influence among players, so that they could collectively agree on and socially 
“contract” themselves to commit to actions that would improve efficiency (van der Kragt et al. 
1983; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). The mechanism can be understood as one by which 
norms of “appropriate” behavior that enhance efficiency became established among players via 
communication (see Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). 
We conducted Experiment 2 to understand whether communication remains effective in 
sustaining PWYW when consumers have limited feedback about each other’s payments, or 
limited information about the market. The experiment was motivated by the fact that, in many 
real-life PWYW examples, consumers are not informed about each other’s specific payments to 
the seller; oftentimes, the most information that they can obtain is information about total 
payment. Similarly, consumers often have little information about the distribution of valuations 
among other consumers in the market. Therefore, we experimentally examined the extent to 
which communication might or might not be able to facilitate coordination when: (a) consumers 
receive feedback only about total payment under PWYW but no feedback about each other’s 
specific payments; and (b) consumers lack “market information” pertaining to the distribution of 
valuations among other consumers. Our findings are supportive. Even when players received 
only partial feedback or no market information, communication could sustain continued 
provision of PWYW. 
Our study is relevant to numerous real-life settings. For instance, several online platforms 
for independent artists (e.g., Bandcamp, NoiseTrade, Jamendo, Magnatune, and Kroogi) allow 
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their artists to determine their pricing format (fixed price versus PWYW). These platforms 
bridge the gap between free (and often illegal) and fixed price models by letting fans determine 
the value of the content and pay an appropriate price. The fact that these PWYW sellers thrive on 
online consumer communication – such as chat forums – is consistent with one of our major 
experimental findings, namely that communication is key to socially efficient coordination that 
sustains long-term PWYW. Further, it has been suggested in the popular press that artists should 
switch from an initial PWYW model to fixed pricing if the PWYW pricing does not yield desired 
financial results (Geere, 2010).2 This prescription is consistent with a feature of our model, 
according to which, if PWYW does not generate sufficient revenues to satisfy the seller’s 
financial goals, then the seller would resort to fixed pricing. 
In more general terms, our research is germane to organizations or individuals who offer 
products or services to buyers and would prefer to not employ conventional fixed prices for their 
products and services. We develop, through a simple, stylized model and two experiments based 
on the model, insights into how such a seller might profitably survive while offering consumers 
PWYW without relying on consumers’ sense of fairness or altruism towards the seller. We also 
contribute to research in social dilemmas by revealing a possible link between donation-based 
business models and social dilemmas. Lastly, through our experiments, we highlight how 
communication could facilitate the establishment of norms of “appropriate” behavior and high 
efficiency in social dilemmas, even when players have limited feedback about each other’s 
payments, or limited information about the distribution of valuations among themselves. As such, 
we contribute to research on “cheap talk” communication that pertains to previous studies in 
social psychology and economics. 
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Literature Review 
Pay What You Want 
While the pricing literature is voluminous, the literature that speaks to PWYW pricing is 
relatively sparse, and the possibility that PWYW may transform a private good into a public 
good has not been systematically investigated. A dominant stream of studies in the PWYW 
literature examines the social psychological determinants of payments in one-off PWYW 
settings; a major finding is that consumers’ payments under PWYW depend largely on their 
social preferences, in particular altruism, concerns for fairness, reciprocity, self-signaling, and 
social welfare concerns (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2010; Gneezy, Gneezy, Riener, & Nelson, 2012; 
Jang & Chu ,2012; Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2009; León, Noguera, & Tena-Sánchez, 2012; Regner 
& Barria, 2009; Riener & Traxler, 2012; Schmidt, Spann, & Zeithammer, 2014). Another stream 
of studies examines the profitability of PWYW. One approach views PWYW as a “loss leader” 
strategy. According to this approach, allowing PWYW for one product can generate profitable 
cross-sales, as consumers buy other high-margin products from the same seller (Steiner, 1997; 
Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2010; El Harbi, Grolleau, & Bekir, 2014). Alternatively, PWYW might 
enable a seller to do away with supply chain intermediaries and thus extract additional profits 
(Elberse & Bergsman, 2008a, b). In contrast with these perspectives, we argue that there are 
additional ways in which PWYW can be profitable in the long run. 
Threshold Public Good Provision as Social Dilemmas 
The literature on threshold public goods is more germane to our inquiry. While different 
variants of the threshold public good game have been studied experimentally (e.g., Cadsby & 
Maynes, 1998; Chen, Au, & Komorita, 1996; Croson & Marks, 2000; Mak & Zwick, 2010; 
McCarter, Budescu, & Sheffran, 2011; Rapoport 1988; van der Kragt et al., 1983), many studies 
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examine the one-off provision setting. In contrast, Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom (1990) initiated 
a line of research (e.g., Walker & Gardner, 1992; Herr, Gardner, & Walker, 1997; Bru, Carera, 
Capra, & Gomez, 2003) that focuses on dynamic experimental versions of common pool 
resource problems, which are closely related to threshold public goods. These experiments 
involve common pool resources that may be available for exploitation by the same players over 
multiple periods, with the characteristic that resource levels in future periods are contingent on 
the degree of exploitation of current resources by the players. Results in this line of research 
have been inconclusive. Bru et al. (2003) observed over-cooperation in this setting, while other 
studies have observed over-exploitation, relative to equilibrium predictions.  
Communication Among Players in Social Dilemmas 
How may high efficiency be achieved in social dilemmas? This is an important practical 
question for our research, because our main thesis is that the type of PWYW mechanism we are 
examining implies a form of social dilemma. A theoretical approach to answering this question 
comes from the concept of “appropriateness” discussed in previous literature (Dawes & Messick, 
2000; Weber et al., 2004; see also a summary in Van Lange et al., 2013, and related discussion 
of “self-control” in Elster, 1985). This concept pertains to the idea that people in social dilemmas 
make decision by asking themselves the following question: “What does a person like me do in a 
situation like this?” Thus high efficiency may be achieved if norms of “appropriate” behavior 
that enhance efficiency can be established among players.   
Previous research suggests that social interactions among players, such as pre-play 
communication, can help establish such norms and improve efficiency through fostering social 
influence among people. Van der Kragt et al. (1983) offered some of the earliest evidence that 
face-to-face communication among subjects before a threshold public good game yielded a much 
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higher success rate of provision, compared with when there was no communication. Their results 
have been further investigated and consolidated in studies such as Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 
(1994) (see also the discussion in Weber et al., 2004). It has been suggested that communication 
may help establish norms and improve efficiency because it enhances common understanding 
(Van Dijk, de Kwaadsteniet, & De Cremer, 2009), bolstering group identity (Brewer, 1979; 
Edney, 1980; Dawes & Messick, 2000), and perhaps even more importantly, because it enables 
players to collectively agree on and socially “contract” themselves to commit to actions that 
would improve efficiency (van der Kragt et al., 1983; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994).  
Pre-play communication is typically non-binding to the players’ decisions. The research 
in experimental economics on “cheap talk” is germane to this issue. Experimental studies on 
cheap talk have covered a wide range of forms of communication, from very restrictive 
announcements of intended strategies to free-form face-to-face communication, in the context of 
laboratory games such as bargaining games, signaling games, coordination games, and others 
(see Crawford, 1998, supplemented by Battaglini & Makarov, 2014, Section 1.1). It is generally 
found that cheap talk, despite being formally non-binding, could lead to better coordination in 
achieving efficient outcomes in many situations. Experimental economics studies that 
specifically focus on cheap talk in threshold public good provision are relatively rare, as is 
indicated in Croson and Marks (2000)’s meta-analysis of threshold public good games (see e.g., 
Table 1 in that article).  
Feedback on Payments and Information about the Market 
Experimental studies on social dilemmas have seldom examined whether communication 
remains effective in facilitating efficiency when players have limited feedback about each other’s 
contributions, or limited information about the distribution of valuations among themselves. 
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Exceptions include the classic public good experiments of Fehr and Gächter (2000) and 
Nikiforakis (2010), who showed (in settings without communication) that insufficient feedback 
about other players’ specific previous actions can have detrimental effects on efficiency. These 
results further highlight the importance of our Experiment 2 in determining if communication 
may overcome lack of information to achieve high efficiency in our decision context. 
A Model of Continuous PWYW Provision 
In this section, we present a simple model to generate our core insights. We shall then use 
a version of this model to set up our experiment. The model consists of the following features:  
(1) There is a seller, S, and a population of N consumers. There are infinitely or 
indefinitely repeated interactions (selling opportunities) between the seller and consumers. Each 
interaction is denoted as a period. The seller sells its products with negligible marginal cost. For 
example, the products can be Wikipedia webpages, digital music tracks, and the like; 
(2) Consumers time-discount future payoffs with a per-period discount factor δ  (0 < δ < 
1). Each consumer i derives a payoff of ui for consuming the seller’s products over one period, so 
that the net payoff to consumer i in a period in which he/she has paid a price pi is ui- pi. 
Consumers may be heterogeneous in that they may have different ui s.
3 
(3) In the first period, the seller offers PWYW to all the consumers. 
(4) The seller will continue to offer PWYW as long as total payment received reaches a 
positive threshold π  in every period. But, if total consumer payment falls below the threshold, it 
is common knowledge among consumers that the seller will charge a pre-specified fixed price, p, 
in all future periods. We assume that the threshold π  is so large that no consumer can single-
handedly pay for the continuation of PWYW with a zero or positive net payoff (i.e.π  > max{ui}). 
In practice, a consumer might still attempt to sustain PWYW temporarily by paying so much as 
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to incur a loss, in the hope that he/she will create momentum for other consumers to pitch in in 
the future. But this strategy is not sustainable, and therefore we focus on stationary outcomes in 
which all consumers obtain non-negative payoffs continuously.  
Our model can be seen as a highly stylized version of the Wikipedia example. Wikipedia 
is offered under PWYW to users of its content, and Wikipedia incurs zero marginal cost when 
users browse its pages. Different users may derive different utility from browsing Wikipedia and 
may have different next best alternatives (such as other reference websites, reference books, and 
the like). As discussed before, once donations from users fall short of a sufficiency threshold, the 
Wikimedia Foundation might have to switch to a subscription fee model (analogous to a fixed 
price). The threshold could be, at a minimum, the fixed per-period operational cost of running 
the website, but can also be any broadly defined minimum revenue requirement for cash flow 
stability and other financial concerns that Wikipedia chooses.4 
Equilibrium Outcomes 
In deriving equilibrium outcomes of our model to be tested in our experiment, we focus 
on simple stationary equilibria in which, in any period in which the seller offers PWYW, any 
consumer i always pays the same price *ip . This means that consumers do not change their 
PWYW payments according to the history of payments or other incidental factors.5  
The no-contribution equilibrium. One obvious feasible equilibrium outcome is that no 
one pays when PWYW is available, so the seller switches to a fixed price from the second period 
onwards, after having offered PWYW in the first period. This is because, for any consumer i, if 
all other consumers pay nothing whenever PWYW is available, i would not be able to pay to 
sustain PWYW with a positive payoff, and hence would be best off paying nothing under 
PWYW as well. We call this the no-contribution equilibrium.  
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In the no-contribution equilibrium, i gains a net payoff of iu in the first period (by paying 
nothing under PWYW); afterwards, under a fixed price, i subscribes to the seller if pui ≥ , but 
refrains from subscribing otherwise. Therefore, if pui ≥ , i’s time-discounted net payoff from 
this equilibriums is: 
.
11
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δ
δ
δ
δ
δδδ
−
−
=
−
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+=+−+−+−+
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If pui < , i’s time-discounted net payoff from this equilibriums is simply iu , because the 
consumer refrains from purchase in all fixed pricing periods. 
The PWYW equilibria. We now consider feasible PWYW equilibria in which some 
consumers pay positive amounts whenever PWYW is available. We first note that total consumer 
payment under PWYW in such equilibria must be exactly equal to the threshold π . If total 
payment under PWYW in equilibrium falls below the threshold, every consumer would be better 
off paying nothing, because only fixed prices will be available in all subsequent periods. On the 
other hand, if total consumer payment under PWYW exceeds the threshold in equilibrium, every 
consumer who pays a positive amount would be better off paying less given all others’ payments, 
because PWYW would continue in the next period. Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have: 
∑ =
i
ip .* π  
In addition, every consumer i who pays a positive amount *ip  under PWYW in equilibrium 
must find it preferable to pay that amount to sustain PWYW, compared with deviating by paying 
less, which would result in the seller switching to a fixed price in all subsequent periods. In the 
first (equilibrium) case, i’s time-discounted net payoff is:  
.
1
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In the second (deviation) case, the most i can earn is to deviate by paying nothing under PWYW, 
which would yield a time-discounted net payoff of: 
,
1
...)()()( 32
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δ
δδδ
−
−
=+−+−+−+
pu
pupupuu iiiii  
if pui ≥ , and a time-discounted net payoff of iu  if pui < . Comparing the net payoffs, we find 
that i is incentivized to pay *ip  to sustain PWYW if the following conditions are satisfied: 



<≤
≥≤
, if *
, if *
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or equivalently,  
},min{* pup ii δ≤ . 
Therefore, as long as a payment scheme, according to which every consumer i has a specified 
payment *ip  under PWYW, satisfies the theoretical conditions that: (1) ∑
i
ip *  = π , and (2)
},min{* pup ii δ≤ for every consumer i, then the payment scheme represents a feasible 
equilibrium outcome in which PWYW is sustained in every period and total payment from 
consumers is always the positive amount of π . Under such an equilibrium, PWYW is indeed 
viable in the long run to the seller, because the threshold has been attained continuously. Further, 
as the above calculation implies, every consumer is either better off (this happens if the 
consumer’s *ip  is strictly less than },min{ puiδ ) or not worse off in a PWYW equilibrium, 
than in the no-contribution equilibrium. That is, in general, PWYW equilibria are more efficient 
for consumers than the no-contribution equilibrium. Moreover, it can be expected in general that 
some consumers would not buy from the seller under fixed pricing as their iu s are less than p. In 
that case, the total welfare of the seller and consumers would be less under the no-contribution 
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equilibrium than under the PWYW equilibria. That is, the PWYW equilibria are also generally 
more efficient for the seller and the consumers as a whole, compared with the no-contribution 
equilibrium.  
 Discussion. Our analysis suggests that our model can be likened to a one-off threshold 
public good game (and thus a social dilemma in a general sense; see Van Lange et al., 2013), 
where the threshold is π  and player i has endowment },min{ puiδ . As long as the players can 
tacitly coordinate their contributions to reach the threshold without any contribution exceeding 
their endowment, the public good will be provided. These cooperative equilibria can be sustained 
solely based on self-interested motives among the players. In other words, continuous PWYW 
can be sustained in our model in the absence of fairness or altruistic motives towards the seller.    
In our model, the availability of another period of PWYW is analogous to the provision 
of the threshold public good. PWYW equilibria exist if the threshold π  is not too high, 
consumers are very forward looking and thus concerned with their future payoffs (δ  is high), the 
fixed price is sufficiently high and serves as a deterrent to consumers (p is not too low), and a 
sufficient number of consumers derive high utility from the seller’s products (a sufficient number 
of iu s are not too low). However, the issue of free riding, endemic to many threshold public 
good games, is relevant to our setting. A second issue, that of tacit coordination, arises as well. 
This is because, as is often the case with threshold public good games (see Croson & Marks, 
2000), the PWYW equilibrium is generally not unique. Instead, a great multitude of equilibria 
are generally feasible, each corresponding to a feasible payment scheme. Even if the focal seller 
S clearly announces the threshold profit π , consumers might still fail, in practice, to sustain 
PWYW, not because each consumer fails to react “correctly”, but because either: (1) one or more 
consumers make “irrational”, perhaps unintentional, errors (such as simple calculation mistakes), 
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or (2) there is insufficient coordination, so that consumers’ assumptions and actions are 
misaligned, as it is unclear to them which particular payment scheme they should converge upon.  
 Two other issues emerge from our model. First, can the seller earn higher profits under 
the PWYW equilibria than under a fixed price? Generally, if the seller will not be able to sustain 
its operations under a fixed price – that is, if even under an optimal fixed price it cannot earn up 
to the threshold π  – then PWYW equilibria could be more profitable than fixed pricing. In 
addition, a scenario under which the seller simply cannot run its business under fixed pricing, 
and thus has to discontinue operations once PWYW fails to generate sufficient revenue, is 
captured in our model when there exists a prohibitively high p that drives all consumers away. 
As discussed above, this factor is conducive to PWYW equilibria. Second, note that some 
consumers may pay nothing under a PWYW equilibrium, and as long as some other consumers 
pay to ensure that total payment reaches the threshold, PWYW is sustainable. Thirdly, we may 
expect that, in PWYW equilibria that are likely to be realized, lower valuation consumers pay 
less than higher valuation consumers. This is consistent with previous observations that PWYW 
can serve as a price discrimination device (see, e.g., Kim et al., 2009). 
 We now turn to an empirical examination of our model. 
Experiment 1 
As discussed in the previous section, our model exhibits a social dilemma with the 
character of threshold public good provision. A major objective of Experiment 1 is to identify 
behavioral conditions that can sustain tacit coordination in that social dilemma. Specifically, our 
experiment was designed to investigate whether and how PWYW equilibria can be attained in a 
laboratory environment that simulates our model.  
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A fundamental feature of our experimental setup was that we simulated the focal seller 
using a computer, and subjects knew this to be so. This approach minimized any non-economic 
motivation towards the seller on the part of the subjects, as subjects might be inclined to be 
altruistic towards a human seller subject, or allow the seller subject to earn a “fair share”. If the 
proposed PWYW provision mechanism is shown to be sustainable with a computer serving as 
the seller in the lab, it might be even more successful in the field, where consumers’ fairness and 
reciprocity considerations towards the seller may provide additional motivation for them to pay 
(e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). 
Basic Setup and Theoretical Considerations 
Our experiment was designed to mimic a model setting in which the consumer population 
consisted of N = 8 players with a per-period time discount factor 9.=δ . To operationalize an 
infinitely repeated game with time discounting in the laboratory, we adopted a common 
experimental procedure that makes use of the equivalence between such a game and a repeated 
game with indefinite termination (see, e.g., Zwick, Rapoport, & Howard, 1992). Specifically, 
each game in the experiment consisted of an indefinite number of rounds – which corresponded 
to the periods in the model – and, conditioned on the game being played now, there was always a 
90% continuation probability that there would be a next round in which the game would be 
played again. This continuation probability is equivalent to the time discount factor 9.=δ  in an 
expected utility framework.  
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
There were two types of players who differed in their valuations of the products or 
options in the experimental game (see Table 1): two Type Y players or “fans” of the seller S that 
offered PWYW, and six Type Z players or “casuals”. Type Y players derived a per-round payoff 
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of uF = 201 tokens (the experimental currency) from the products sold by S. Type Z players 
derived a per-round payoff of uC = 49 tokens from S’s products. All players were made aware of 
the seller’s condition that PWYW should yield a threshold level of revenue to the seller, failing 
which PWYW would be discontinued and a fixed price regime would be instituted. 
In addition, we introduced an outside option that was an alternative to S’s products. The 
outside option was always priced at 48 tokens per round. It provided no benefit to the Type Y 
players (as “fans” of S, they would not compromise with the purchase of anything else) but 
provided the same payoff as S to Type Z players (who, as “casuals”, were indifferent between S’s 
products and the outside option), i.e., 49 tokens per round. These parameters were common to all 
conditions, as was the fixed price that S would charge per round once PWYW was discontinued, 
which we set at p = 200 tokens (note that the per-round profit maximizing price for S under fixed 
pricing would also be 200 tokens, if Type Y players would buy from S only if they could earn at 
least one token’s net payoff from its products). Because the outside option was irrelevant to Type 
Y players, the amount that a Type Y player would pay in a PWYW equilibrium could not be 
higher than 180200 =⋅δ tokens, applying results from the previous section. 
On the other hand, Type Z players would choose the outside option when S imposed a 
fixed price of 200 tokens, since that price would be too high relative to their utility from S’s 
products, while the outside option at least offered them a net payoff of one token (= 49 – 48 
tokens) per round. This means that the effective fixed price that a Type Z player would pay when 
S imposed fixed pricing would be 48 tokens. Thus the amount that a Type Z player would pay in 
a PWYW equilibrium could not be higher than 2.4348 =⋅δ tokens. Together with the upper limit 
of 180 tokens for a Type Y player’s payment under a PWYW equilibrium, the threshold π could 
not be higher than: 
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2.61962.432180 =⋅+⋅  tokens, 
if there could be any feasible PWYW equilibria. This serves as the theoretically derived 
condition for the feasibility of continuous provision of PWYW in our experiment. As such, we 
set the threshold for continuation of PWYW at π = 400 tokens across all conditions, which 
ensured that PWYW equilibria would be theoretically feasible in our setup.6 
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
Behavioral Considerations and Design 
Our experimental manipulations were motivated by behavioral considerations. They 
included a number of realistic situational variables which would be relevant in facilitating the 
establishment of norms of “appropriate” behavior (Weber et al., 2004).  
The first manipulated factor was the framing of the experimental task. In half of the 
conditions, the frame was “rich”, featuring the purchase of songs of independent music bands, 
which mimicked some of the real-life PWYW examples discussed earlier. In the other half of the 
conditions, the frame was neutral. Subjects exposed to a “rich” frame may potentially be 
influenced by the cover story of independent music bands per se, rather than by the strategic 
nature of the situation (see e.g., Chou, McConnell, Nagel, & Plott, 2009). The influence might 
then result in different perceptions of what would be normative or “appropriate”, compared with 
perceptions under the neutral frame.  
The second factor manipulated involved explicit mechanisms that might enhance 
coordination to sustain PWYW. These included:  
(1) A “chat” manipulation that offered subjects the opportunity to carry out online chat-
room-style communication;  
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(2) A “suggestion” manipulation by which the experimenter provided suggested 
payments to subjects. Specifically, it was suggested that each Type Y player should pay 164 
tokens and each Type Z players should pay 12 tokens to S under PWYW. If all subjects followed 
the suggestion, an “equi-earnings” equilibrium would result, according to which everyone would 
receive identical earnings in every round. Once subjects realized this feature, the payments 
constituted a fair and natural choice of equilibrium for them, and as such was behaviorally a 
“focal point” (Schelling, 1960). While we considered this idea to be of sufficient potential to be 
included in our experiment, we also note that the provision of reference points has been found 
not to be effective in increasing PWYW revenues (Johnson & Cui, 2013). 
Overall, Experiment 1 employed a 2 (frame: rich versus neutral) x 3 (coordination 
mechanism: no mechanism versus chat versus suggestion) between-subjects factorial design. 
Experimental Procedures 
One hundred ninety-two student subjects from a major university in Hong Kong 
participated in the experiment. All the subjects were fluent in English and volunteered to 
participate in the study, which was billed as a decision-making experiment with payoff 
contingent on performance. Subjects were divided into groups of eight, so that every subject 
interacted with the same group of seven other subjects throughout the session. There were six 
groups of subjects in each condition with rich frame, and two groups in each condition with 
neutral frame. During the experiment, all decisions were made via networked computers using 
the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Each session consisted of a practice game followed by 20 games for payment, each with 
an indefinite number of rounds. In every condition, after all the games were concluded in a 
session, 5 games were chosen at random from the 20 games for payment, and each subject was 
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paid his/her earnings from all the rounds in the chosen games after converting tokens to Hong 
Kong dollars at the rate of 1 token = HK$0.1 (US$1 ≈ HK$7.8). In addition, every subject was 
paid a show-up fee of HK$40. A typical session lasted approximately two hours. Average subject 
payment across all conditions, including the show-up fee, was HK$171.7, which was 
commensurate with typical hourly student wages at that university. 
Framing.  The instructions used in both frames are included in the Appendix. The 
instructions introduced subjects to the basic setup and decision tasks of the experiment, in 
descriptive terms that varied with frame but were formally equivalent across frames. 
Rich frame.  Subjects were told that two (fictitious) bands, “Playa” and “Quello”, had 
each uploaded a new song to their site during every round of the game, to allow people to listen 
to it online.  During each round, a player could either listen to a Playa song or to a Quello song, 
or to neither.  At the beginning of each game, each player was assigned to one of two types: “Fan 
of Playa” or “Casual Listener”. As such, the types differed in their valuations of the songs of the 
two bands as summarized in Table 1. Of the eight players in each group, two were Fans of Playa 
and six were Casual Listeners.  Every player’s role stayed the same in all rounds of the same 
game, but was re-assigned randomly from game to game, with the constraint that each player had 
to be a Fan of Playa in 5 games and a Casual Listener in 15 games.   
Neutral frame.  The instructions were formally equivalent to those provided under the 
“rich” frame but no specific cover story was provided.  For example, subjects were given options 
named “S”, “N”, and “R” to choose from, instead of “Playa”, “Neither”, and “Quello”. Their 
experimental task was described plainly as a choice between three options rather than a choice of 
listening (or not) to a song.  At the beginning of each game, subjects were assigned to be of 
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either “Type Y” or “Type Z”, instead of “Fan of Playa” or “Casual Listener”.  The threshold was 
similarly described in neutral terms.  
Common to both frames, at the beginning of every round, the simulated seller S 
announced its pricing policy for that round, indicating whether it offered PWYW or a fixed price 
of 48 tokens in that round. If PWYW was offered, each player then decided whether to buy from 
S at a non-negative price of her choice, to buy the outside option at a price of 48 tokens, or to not 
buy. If S offered a fixed price, each player then decided whether to buy from S at the fixed price, 
to buy the outside option, or to not buy. 
Players made independent decisions simultaneously. After all players had made their 
decisions in a round, they were informed about the choices and prices paid by every player under 
anonymous labels. If PWYW was offered in that round, players were also informed about 
whether total payment reached the threshold and whether S would continue to offer PWYW or 
would implement a fixed price in the next round. Once S implemented fixed pricing in a round, 
players could expect that S would continue to implement it in all remaining rounds in the game. 
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the sequence of decisions in each round. 
A randomization process then took place, so that the game proceeded to the next round 
with 90% chance and ended immediately with 10% chance. As discussed earlier, this procedure 
operationalized a per-round time discount factor of 9.=δ  for the subjects’ payoffs.   
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
Coordination mechanisms. In the “chat” conditions, subjects were allowed to engage in 
online communication over a “chat forum” before every game for a limited duration.7 In the 
“suggestion” conditions, the experimenter provided all subjects with a suggested payment 
scheme for sustaining PWYW. The suggested scheme appeared on every decision screen and 
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was also mentioned in the instructions. For example, under the rich frame, subjects read the 
following in their instructions: 
Suggested payments under the “pay as you wish” scheme  
 
Although Playa allows players to pay as much as they wish for listening to their song 
in a round when the “pay as you wish” scheme is implemented, they nevertheless provide 
suggested payment amounts.  In particular, they suggest that Fans of Playa pay 164 tokens 
and hence earn (201-164=) 37 tokens in such a round.  Casual Listeners are suggested to pay 
12 tokens and hence earn (49-12=) 37 tokens in such a round.  If all players pay their 
suggested amount in such a round, the total payment to Playa will be (2x164+6x12=) 400, 
exactly the amount needed to keep the “pay as you wish” scheme going to the next round (if 
there is a next round). 
 
The corresponding passage under the neutral frame was: 
Suggested payments under the “pay as you wish” scheme 
 
Although players are allowed to pay as much as they wish for S in a round when the “pay 
as you wish” scheme is implemented, suggested payment amounts are nevertheless provided.  In 
particular, Type Y players are suggested to pay 164 tokens and hence earn (201-164=) 37 tokens 
in such a round.  Type Z players are suggested to pay 12 tokens and hence earn (49-12=) 37 
tokens in such a round.  If all players pay their suggested amount in such a round, the total 
payment to S will be (2x164+6x12=) 400, exactly the amount needed to keep the “pay as you 
wish” scheme going to the next round (if there is a next round). 
 
Analysis and Results 
All analyses and results reported here exclude data from the practice games in which 
subject behavior was not incentivized. We focus on the following dependent variables of interest:  
(a) At the group level, a sustainability measure that is equal to the total number of rounds 
with sustained PWYW throughout the session. A round with sustained PWYW is defined to be 
one in which PWYW was allowed and total payment to the focal seller reached the threshold. 
The unit of observation is group; 
(b) At the individual level, the payment to the focal seller S under PWYW by Type Y and 
Type Z players (“Fans of Playa” and “Casual Listeners” under rich framing) respectively. The 
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unit of observation is the payment to S in each PWYW round by each player of the relevant type. 
To account for possible correlations among decisions by the same player over rounds, as well as 
among players in the same group, we conduct our analysis on these payment variables using the 
generalized estimating equations (GEE) approach (see Hardin & Hilbe, 2003). 
We first describe our statistical analyses and then provide further insights that emerge 
from a more detailed examination of the data and the chat log. 
Statistical analysis. We first test the effect of framing.  At the group level, we conduct an 
ANOVA employing a 2 (frame: rich versus neutral) x 3 (coordination mechanism: no 
mechanism versus chat versus suggestion) between-subjects design on the sustainability measure. 
We find no significant main effect of framing (F(1,18) = 1.82, p = .19), nor is there a significant 
interaction (F(2,18) = 1.45, p = .26). Then, at the individual level, we conduct GEE analysis on 
the effect of framing on Type Y and Type Z players’ payments respectively given each 
coordination mechanism manipulation. The resulting estimates are almost always not 
significantly different from zero (p > .2 in all but one case) indicating that payments were largely 
unaffected by framing. The only exception appears with Type Y players’ payments with no 
coordination mechanism, where the mean payment decreased from 126.51 tokens under the 
neutral frame (s.d. = 72.32 tokens) to 62.96 tokens under the rich frame (s.d. = 84.96 tokens) at 
significance level p < .01. While this single anomalous finding may deserve more investigation, 
it only appears in “control” conditions without coordination mechanisms; otherwise the mean 
payments did not differ significantly across different frames. As such, we consider the framing 
manipulation to have had no effect on the major dependent variables in ways that affects our 
major analysis and conclusions. For the remaining analyses, therefore, the data from the two 
framing manipulations are combined.  
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– Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here – 
Table 2 presents the main results of Experiment 1 aggregated over the framing 
manipulations. First of all, the table reveals that, sustainability (167.50 rounds on average) was 
much higher with chat than under any other coordination mechanism condition (no more than 36 
rounds on average). This is confirmed by further statistical analysis on the sustainability measure.  
A 3-factor (coordination mechanism manipulation) ANOVA on this variable yields F(2,21)= 
91.09, p < .01. Pairwise comparisons indicate that sustainability is significantly higher under chat 
than in the other two cases (p< .05 in both comparisons), while suggestion yielded only 
marginally higher sustainability than no coordination mechanism (p = .09).   
Most importantly, with chat, the mean total number of rounds with PWYW was more 
than 86.78% of the mean total number of rounds played, indicating highly sustained PWYW. To 
offer a more comprehensive picture, Figure 2 presents the mean number of rounds with sustained 
PWYW classified by the game’s length (in rounds). For purposes of reference, the line y = x, 
representing perfect sustainability, is also provided. With chat, the plot is much closer to the 
perfect sustainability line than the plots associated with the other conditions, all of which largely 
failed to sustain PWYW. The figure thus provides a visual illustration of our major findings from 
the experiment, namely the effectiveness of online chat-room-style communication in sustaining 
PWYW.  
Table 2 also indicates that payments of Type Y players were higher with chat than 
otherwise, but the same cannot be said for Type Z players. GEE analysis shows that Type Y 
players paid significantly more with chat compared with both no mechanism and suggestion; 
Type Y players also paid significantly more with suggestion than with no mechanism (p < .01 in 
all relevant comparisons). Thus it seems that suggestion as a coordination mechanism did have 
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some effect on Type Y players, but not strong enough to actually lead to highly sustainable 
PWYW. On the other hand, Type Z players’ payments were not significantly different between 
any of the two coordination mechanism manipulations (p ≥ .1 in all relevant GEE comparisons). 
These results highlight the fact that chat did not necessarily enhance efficiency by leading 
every player to pay more than otherwise under PWYW. While it could lead to some of the 
players (Type Y players who valued the target product highly) to pay more, it could not lead to 
significant changes in payments from the remaining players (Type Z players). Furthermore, the 
mean payments under chat (160.76 tokens with Type Y players; 12.28 tokens with Type Z 
players) were close to the equi-earnings equilibrium of Type Y players paying 164 tokens and 
Type Z players paying 12 tokens (see the Thick description below for more details on this point). 
What chat did was to enable players to cooperate and mutually commit to a payment scheme that 
sustained PWYW. Without chat, Type Z players might be paying in vain to sustain PWYW 
because Type Y players tended to not pay enough. In fact, directionally (although the effect is 
not statistically significant), Table 2 suggests that Type Z players could be “trying too hard” to 
sustain PWYW when there was no coordination mechanism, by paying more than they would 
have to with chat. 
To sum up, our statistical analysis suggests that a PWYW policy with a pre-announced 
threshold induced highly sustainable PWYW among subjects, if: (1) the policy theoretically 
admits PWYW equilibria, and (2) subjects were allowed to communicate with each other 
through online chat-room-style communication preserving anonymity, before payments were 
made. But how did chat lead to such efficient outcomes? We now examine further the data and 
chat log to address this question. 
Thick description. The following insights emerge from the data and the chat log: 
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(1) Under fixed pricing, subjects paid according to predictions (i.e. Type Y players chose S and 
Type Z players chose R) in at least 96% of the observations in any condition; 
(2) In the chat conditions, even when early on in the session (at least before game 10 and even 
by game 5 or 6) the groups were often playing exactly according to or close to an equilibrium 
payment scheme that sustained PWYW with total payment equal to 400 tokens. Six groups 
played according to the equi-earnings equilibrium payment scheme of [Type Y: 164 tokens; 
Type Z: 12 tokens], while one group played according to an almost equi-earnings equilibrium 
with a payment scheme of [Type Y: 170 tokens; Type Z: 10 tokens]. The remaining group 
arrived at a payment scheme of [Type Y: 162 tokens; Type Z: 13 tokens], which make up a 
total payment of 402 tokens;  
(3) It appears that many subjects intuited from early on that they should cooperate to sustain 
PWYW. This is most directly reflected in the chat log in the chat condition in which there 
was hardly any challenge to the notion that subjects should cooperate. Subjects were instead 
occupied from early on with arriving at a commonly agreed upon payment scheme through 
chat. Here are some suggestive quotes: 
(a) “…[if] anyone cheat (sic) all of us get the least ... including the cheater,”  
(b) “If we know when [the game ends] we can simply pay zero [in the last round] ... but 
[since we do not, it is] not worth taking the risk,”  
(c) “… please think of the benefit of the whole team,” 
(d) “… if you break our relationship ... you will earn less,” 
(e) “PLEASE DON'T TRY TO CHEAT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” 
(f) “…don't worry, everyone [has] fair chance to be [Fan of Playa],” 
(g) “…the more the number of round[s] the more we gain.” 
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(4) Further inspection of the chat log supports van der Kragt et al. (1983)’s similar findings that 
communication enhanced coordination in two major ways: 
(a) Subjects could work out a PWYW-sustaining payment scheme that everyone agreed upon, 
which was essentially a “minimally contributing set” (in van der Kragt et al.’s terms) that 
added up to exactly the threshold. In the experiment, this was usually achieved by one 
player suggesting the payment scheme and then discussing with/explaining to other 
players why they should follow it; 
(b) Subjects could then make commitments to each other that they would adhere to the 
payment scheme that was agreed upon (see also Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). In 
other words, chat allowed for the establishment of an obligation or a “social contract”, 
even though chat was essentially “cheap talk” and, if individual deviations in a game 
occurred, it would be very difficult to identify the renegade. It was typical that, following 
the suggestion and discussion over a payment scheme (say, the equi-earnings scheme), 
every player would send out a single-line message as a confirmation to others of his/her 
agreement with the scheme, before the current chat session was concluded. Also, since 
the suggestion condition did not lead to highly sustainable PWYW, a “social contract” 
was apparently essential for PWYW sustainability and was more important than 
prescribed payments given by the seller.  
To summarize, chat enhanced coordination by helping players to establish among themselves 
a norm of “appropriate” payments. Players found the norm justifiable and also found 
themselves obliged to follow it because of prior commitment (in the form of a “social 
contract”) in the chat forum. It must also be emphasized that subjects were predominantly 
concerned with whether cooperative PWYW payments could enhance their self-interest in 
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the long run. They tended to persuade each other to cooperate based on normative arguments 
regarding how paying cooperatively could lead to improvements in every subject’s own long-
term payoffs, with scant considerations for fairness or altruistic issues towards the seller 
(which, after all, was computer-simulated). Groups that succeeded in sustaining PWYW were, 
as a rule, motivated collectively by those kinds of arguments to succeed; 
(5) In the control condition with no coordination mechanism, subjects appeared to have had 
serious coordination problems. Attempts to sustain PWYW by individual subjects were very 
often undermined by other subjects’ low or zero payments.  Even in the suggestion condition, 
initial enthusiasm to sustain PWYW could have been dampened because certain subjects 
tried to take a little advantage by paying slightly less than what was suggested for their role, 
despite the very clear realization that everyone’s payment was critical to sustaining PWYW.  
Nevertheless, attempts to establish sustained PWYW could be observed throughout the 
session in both control and suggestion conditions. 
To conclude, Experiment 1’s data suggests that chat led to effectively sustained PWYW, 
because subjects could then collectively agree on and socially “contract” themselves to commit 
to a payment scheme that constituted a PWYW equilibrium. In the process, individual subjects’ 
misaligned behavior with respect to that payment scheme could be eliminated through social 
influence. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 established that online chat-room-style communication prior to paying 
could facilitate tacit coordination at the payment stage to sustain efficient provision of PWYW. It 
should be noted, however, that subjects in Experiment 1 were provided a breakdown of payments 
from all subjects after every round in the experiment. Previous payments could have been 
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perceived by players as normative signals of “appropriate” behavior (see Weber & Murnighan, 
2008). Such information could be a confound that undermines our claim that communication per 
se could establish norms of payments which enhanced efficiency. Moreover, as discussed earlier, 
in many real-life PWYW examples, consumers are not informed about each other’s specific 
payments to the seller; oftentimes, the most information that they can obtain is information about 
total payment.  
On the other hand, subjects in Experiment 1 were clearly informed about the distribution 
of player types in the market (two players who valued the target product highly, and six players 
whose valuation of the target product was not as high). But in many real-life PWYW examples, 
consumers often have little information about the distribution of valuations among other 
consumers in the market.  
These considerations highlight the importance of experimentally testing the extent to 
which communication might or might not be able to facilitate coordination when: (a) consumers 
receive feedback only about total payment under PWYW but no feedback about each other’s 
specific payments; and (b) consumers lack “market information” pertaining to the distribution of 
valuations among other consumers.  Experiment 2 was designed to address these considerations.  
The experiment employed a 2 (feedback: full versus partial) x 2 (market information: full 
versus no) between-subjects factorial design. The setup was similar to the chat condition with 
neutral frame in Experiment 1 except that, across conditions, we manipulated the amount of 
feedback to players regarding previous payments (full breakdown of previous payments versus 
only the total payment), and the information that players were given about the distribution of 
Type Y and Type Z players in the group (full versus no market information).  
Experimental Procedures 
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One hundred sixty student subjects from a major university in Bangkok, Thailand, 
participated in the experiment. All the subjects were fluent in English and volunteered to 
participate in the study, which was billed as a decision-making experiment with payoff 
contingent on performance. Subjects were divided into groups of eight, so that every subject 
interacted with the same group of seven other subjects throughout the session.  There were five 
groups of subjects in each condition. The conversion rate from token to Thai baht  was 1 token = 
0.13 baht (1 baht ≈ US$0.033). In addition, every subject was paid a show-up fee of 40 baht.  A 
typical session lasted approximately two hours. Average subject payment across all conditions, 
including the show-up fee, was 210.4 baht, which was commensurate with typical hourly student 
wages at that university. 
The experimental setup in all conditions followed the chat condition with neutral frame in 
Experiment 1 with the following distinguishing features:  
Feedback. In the full feedback conditions, after all players had made their decisions in a 
round, they were informed about the choices and prices paid by every player under anonymous 
labels. If PWYW was offered in that round, players were also informed about whether total 
payment reached the threshold and whether S would continue to offer PWYW or would 
implement fixed pricing in the next round.  In the partial feedback conditions, players were not 
given such detailed feedback. If PWYW was offered in a round, they were informed only about 
the total payment to S and whether S would continue to offer PWYW in the next round. The 
players received no feedback about other players’ decisions otherwise.  
Market information. In the full market information conditions, players were informed 
that there were always two Type Y players and six Type Z players in each group, and that each 
“PAY WHAT YOU WANT”  30 
 
 
player would be Type Y in 5 games and Type Z in 15 games. In the no market information 
conditions, players were not given any such information.  
Because online chat-room-style communication was allowed in all conditions, it was in 
principle possible for players to disclose their previous payments and/or types to each other, even 
when such information was not provided by default. But chat messages might not be truthful, nor 
might they be perceived as credible. It was thus our objective to assess if communication might 
still be able to facilitate coordination to sustain PWYW in this case. 
Analysis and Results 
Our data analysis approach for Experiment 2 is similar to that for Experiment 1 where 
appropriate. All analyses and results reported exclude data from the practice games in which 
subject behavior was not incentivized. At the group level, we focus on a sustainability measure 
that is equal to the total number of rounds with sustained PWYW throughout the session. At the 
individual level, we focus on the payment to the focal seller S under PWYW by Type Y and 
Type Z players respectively. We conduct our analysis on these payment variables using the GEE 
approach to account for possible correlations among decisions by the same player or by players 
in the same group. We first describe our statistical analyses and then provide further insights that 
emerge from a more detailed examination of the data and the chat log. 
– Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here – 
Statistical analysis. Table 3 presents the main results. First, the table reveals that 
sustainability was reasonably high in all conditions. An ANOVA employing a 2 (feedback: full 
versus partial) x 2 (market information: full versus no) between-subjects design on the 
sustainability measure yielded neither significant main effects nor significant interactions (p > .1 
in all cases). This finding further supports our observation that, even when subjects only had 
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partial feedback or no market information, chat alone could facilitate coordination across our 
experimental conditions. 
The mean total number of rounds with PWYW across conditions was at least 49.2% of 
the mean total number of rounds played. Except for the condition with the least amount of 
information (i.e. partial feedback/no market information), on average a group was able to sustain 
PWYW in at least 68% of the rounds played. To offer a more comprehensive picture, Figure 3 
displays the mean number of rounds with sustained PWYW classified by the game’s length (in 
rounds). The plots are approximately equally close to the perfect sustainability line, except the 
condition with the least amount of feedback and market information.  
Table 3 indicates that payments of both types of players varied across conditions. GEE 
analysis of the payments shows that: (1) Given full market information, the payment of either 
type of players did not differ significantly with full versus partial feedback (both at p > .5); (2) 
Given no market information, Type Y players paid significantly more with full relative to partial 
feedback while Type Z players paid significantly less (both at p < .01).8 That is, payments under 
the two full market information conditions were largely the same, while payments under the two 
no market information conditions were sensitive to the level of feedback, a finding to be 
discussed further below. Nevertheless, as suggested by the sustainability analysis, such payment 
differences did not lead to significant differences in total payment, and it is the total payment that 
directly impacted PWYW sustainability. This outcome occurred apparently because individual 
payment differences (whenever statistically significant) were typically in opposite directions for 
different player types, which then mitigated each other at the aggregate level. 
To sum up, our statistical analysis of Experiment 2’s data suggests that communication 
was highly effective in sustaining PWYW even when players only had limited feedback about 
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each other’s payments, or limited information about the market. But how did communication 
lead to efficient outcomes even when the players did not have full feedback or market 
information? We now examine further the data and chat log to address this question.  
Thick description. The following insights emerge from the data and the chat log: 
(1) Under fixed pricing, subjects paid according to predictions (i.e. Type Y players chose S and 
Type Z players chose R) in at least 90% of the observations in any condition; 
(2) Consistent with Table 3, Figure 3, and the statistical tests, we do not observe significant 
differences between the conditions in terms of the groups’ performance in sustaining PWYW, 
although groups in the partial feedback/no market information condition tended to do slightly 
less well. Each condition had at least one group which, by the end of the session, had 
converged upon an equilibrium payment scheme that sustained PWYW. There were a variety 
of ways by which the group attempted to “solve” the problem of coordination by mutually 
committing to a payment scheme, with the equi-earnings scheme being a relatively frequent, 
but by no means dominant, outcome. In general, high efficiency and stable sustenance of 
PWYW were associated with the players arriving at the equi-earnings scheme; 
(3) Groups that did not exhibit stable sustenance of PWYW could still often sustain PWYW for 
at least 45% of the played rounds except for one group in the partial feedback/full market 
information condition (35%), and two groups in the partial feedback/no market information 
condition (more than 20%); 
(4) An inspection of the chat log shows that subjects in all conditions had the same concerns, and 
made use of chat to cooperate in the same way, as described for Experiment 1 in points (4) 
and (5) of the Thick description in that experiment’s Analysis and Results section. That is, 
chat was used by the group to arrive at a PWYW-sustaining payment scheme and then to 
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express their commitment to the “social contract” that bound them to the scheme, while 
admonishing each other to be “honest” and to not “cheat”. Partial feedback or no market 
information could present obstacles to coordination through chat, but the obstacles were not 
necessarily significant, nor were they insurmountable. Moreover, there is evidence that: 
(a) Whether feedback was full or partial was not crucial to the functions of the chat in 
sustaining PWYW. First, chat facilitated coordination partly because the group could 
then mutually agree on a payment scheme, and such agreement could be reached 
independently of whether the players observed each other’s previous payments. 
Second, even when there was full feedback on specific payments, subjects remained 
anonymous in the online network environment of the experiment, so that “cheaters” 
violating the “social contract” could not be personally identifiable. On the other hand, 
even when feedback was partial, all that the group needed to know in order to 
maintain the “social contract” was whether there was any cheating (i.e., whether the 
total payment was less than expected), not any further details. Nevertheless, full 
feedback about the choices and payments of every player did seem to facilitate the 
group’s own “market research” effort when they had no market information, as 
explained below;   
(b) In the no market information conditions, subjects might be able to figure out the 
distribution of the types of players in the following ways: (i) they could disclose their 
types to each other (even though their disclosures were not necessarily credible); (ii) 
they could first assign a normatively acceptable payment scheme to each other (such 
as some approximate form of equi-earnings scheme that guaranteed a “decent” payoff 
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of similar magnitude to every type of player) and then deduce from the feedback what 
the distribution might be. Such an approach was especially feasible with full feedback; 
(c) In fact, as can be seen in Table 3, Figure 3, our statistical analysis, as well as point 
(2)(c) in this section, full feedback/no market information groups could sustain 
PWYW slightly better than full feedback/full market information groups. The average 
payment by type in the former condition is also very close to the equi-earnings 
equilibrium. Our inspection of the chat log suggests that, when there was no market 
information, the group’s effort to understand the distribution of player types among 
themselves might have led to increased interactions that further improved group 
bonding and the strength of the “social contract”. Yet it appears that this could only 
happen when there was full feedback, so that it was relatively easy for the group to 
determine market information through the feedback.  
To conclude, Experiment 2’s data suggests that chat could sustain PWYW provision even 
when subjects had limited feedback about each other’s payments, or limited information about 
the laboratory market. This occurred because: (a) chat helped to establish a “social contract” 
among subjects, and knowledge of whether the total payment reached threshold or not was 
sufficient for the monitoring of the “social contract”; and (b) subjects could quickly find out 
information about the market by disclosing their private information to each other, or through 
inferences based on the received feedback (especially when there was full feedback). We explore 
the managerial implications of these observations in the following section. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we offer a perspective on PWYW that augments the literature on this 
pricing policy. We demonstrate that, if the seller and consumers interact repeatedly, and future 
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provision of PWYW depends on whether current revenue under PWYW is sufficiently large for 
the seller to achieve financial goals, then paying under PWYW can be likened to paying for a 
threshold public good. An implication, which we demonstrate through analyzing a simple model, 
is that continuous provision of the PWYW option can be profitable to the seller through 
sustained cooperative equilibria among consumers. The implication is valid even when all 
consumers are purely self-interested with no fairness or altruistic motives towards the seller – 
motives that appear to be the focus in much previous research on PWYW. Our experiments 
provide further empirical evidence for the feasibility of this implication. 
In Experiment 1, we observe that if there was anonymous online chat prior to paying, 
then efficient tacit coordination at the payment stage could be accomplished to achieve 
continuous provision of PWYW. Such long-term provision of PWYW is generally an efficient 
outcome for the seller and for consumers. That is, efficient, cooperative equilibria in our PWYW 
situations can be sustained through communication in the absence of fairness or altruistic 
motives towards the seller. Indeed, the chat log in our experiment suggests that subjects were 
predominantly concerned with whether cooperative PWYW payments could enhance their own 
self-interest in the long run. They also tended to persuade each other to cooperate based on 
normative arguments regarding how paying cooperatively could lead to improvements in every 
subject’s own long-term payoffs, with scant considerations for fairness or altruistic issues 
towards the seller (which, after all, was computer-simulated). Groups that succeeded in 
sustaining PWYW were, as a rule, motivated collectively by those kinds of arguments to succeed. 
We find that communication was important since subjects could then collectively agree 
on and socially “contract” themselves to commit to a payment scheme that constitutes a PWYW 
equilibrium. In the process, if individual subjects’ behavior was misaligned with respect to that 
“PAY WHAT YOU WANT”  36 
 
 
payment scheme, social influence could help establish a norm of “appropriate” behavior to 
eliminate the misalignment.  
In Experiment 2, we find that chat could sustain PWYW provision even when subjects 
only had feedback about total payment under PWYW, but no feedback about each other’s 
specific payments, as well as when they lacked market information pertaining to the distribution 
of valuations among themselves. This occurred because: (a) chat established a “social contract” 
among subjects, and knowledge of whether the total payment reached threshold or not was 
sufficient for the monitoring of the “social contract”; and (b) subjects could quickly find out 
information about the market by disclosing their private information to each other, or through 
inferences based on the received feedback (especially when there was full feedback). Our 
findings confirm the power of communication when information about other players’ payments 
or valuations was limited; in this respect, we contribute to the few previous studies on feedback 
in public good games, such as Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Nikiforakis (2010). 
Managerial Implications  
Our results suggest a way for PWYW to succeed, namely that the seller clearly 
announces its intention to switch from PWYW to a fixed price should a revenue threshold not be 
achieved, and this explicit “threat” is perceived to be credible by consumers. We also suggest 
that PWYW does not have to be a loss leader strategy that needs to be subsidized by derivative, 
secondary revenue. In markets in which there is a segment of “die-hard” consumers who can 
potentially influence casual consumers, PWYW could be a feasible pricing policy.  
Our experiments highlight the role of consumer communication in facilitating 
cooperation to sustain PWYW. The means by which subjects communicated in our experiments, 
namely online chat forum, is one of a wide range of social media channels through which people 
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interacted frequently in today’s world. Corroborating our findings, social scientists have 
observed and analyzed real-world phenomena in disaster relief (e.g., Gao, Barbier, & Goolsby, 
2011) and political activism (e.g., Pickard, 2008), among others, that demonstrate the power of 
social media to efficiently facilitate consensus, mutual commitment, and cooperation on a large 
scale. Researchers have especially noted the striking use of social media by people to rally 
themselves in anti-globalization protests (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2002) and the “Occupy 
movement” (Juris, 2012) in recent years. Given these phenomena, it seems all the more plausible 
that social media can effectively coordinate consumer payments to sustain a seller’s PWYW.      
Specifically, our research suggests that continuous PWYW is likely to be successful 
given a number of contextual features, which form a set of sufficient (rather than necessary) 
conditions:  
(1) There are repeated interactions between the seller and consumers;  
(2) The threshold set by the seller is not too high;  
(3) Consumers are very forward looking;  
(4) The fixed price is sufficiently high to be a deterrent for consumers;  
(5) A sufficient number of consumers derive high utility from the seller’s products;9 and  
(6) Normative payments can be established among consumers through communication platforms.  
Moreover, whether the seller publicizes a breakdown of payments is not crucial as long as 
there is effective communication among the major contributing consumers. This is because, 
firstly, the mere feedback of total payment can be sufficient to bind them to their promises. 
Secondly, through communication, consumers could disclose their valuations of the target 
product to each other. Thirdly, repeated interactions could help consumers figure out the 
composition of types of consumers in the market by comparing the payments agreed and 
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committed to over the communication platform with the actual payments – this is especially true 
when the seller opts to publicize a more detailed breakdown of payment distributions. 
Several real-world PWYW examples can help illustrate the above features in practice: 
(a) Wikipedia. Our insight mirrors what Jimmy Wales has been trying to accomplish with his 
repeated pleas to users of Wikipedia content, as discussed at the beginning of this paper. 
There are, indeed, repeated interactions between Wikipedia and its users (feature (1)). 
Although Wales’ pleas have not necessarily specified a clear threshold, the Wikimedia 
Foundation typically announces a target that appears at the top of every Wikipedia page 
during a donation campaign, and compares that with what they have raised so far. More 
importantly, users are aware that some threshold exists, and given the success in previous 
donation campaigns, the threshold has not been unreasonably high for a considerable number 
of users (feature (2)), and many users must have been sufficiently forward looking in 
deciding to donate (feature (3)). Anecdotally, the “fixed price” (or other equivalent forms of 
future outcomes, such as advertising) that would appear if PWYW is discontinued may also 
be assumed to be a deterrent for many users (feature (4)); it can further be assumed that many 
users derive high utility from Wikipedia (feature (5)). Lastly, instead of relying on feature (6), 
Wikipedia establishes normative payments through suggesting donation amounts in its 
campaigns. Given the results of previous Wikipedia donation campaigns, feature (6) seems to 
be of lesser importance in this case.   
(b) Independent artists such as independent music bands. Independent artists typically aim to 
continuously produce works for admirers (feature (1)) and tend not to have a high financial 
threshold to simply survive (feature (2)). A group of fans likely constitute the artist’s core 
customers, who would look forward to sustaining the artist’s long-term productivity (feature 
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(3)), and who derive high utility from the artist’s works (feature (5)). They would be willing 
to pay sufficiently high prices by their own choice, so as to avoid the prospect of a relatively 
high fixed price if the artist turns to selling works through conventional means (feature (4)). 
This segment probably has the ability to influence a “casual” segment, comprising friends 
and relatives, to patronize the artist. Both segments together often form a closely knit 
network with frequent communications whereby they can establish norms over how best to 
support their artist (feature (6)). It is thus understandable that independent artists have 
managed to thrive via the PWYW platforms described at the beginning of this paper.   
(c) The Humble Bundles (http://www.humblebundle.com/), a series of collections of video 
games, music albums, and eBooks, that are sold and distributed online through a common 
platform. The bundles are typically offered on a semi-regular basis under PWYW during a 
two-week period; consumers can divide up their payments among the creators of the bundles, 
the Humble Bundle platform, and charity, in any proportion of their choosing. Several of the 
bundles have brought in over $1 million and the 20 completed bundles as of January 2013 
have raised more than $32.7 million.  However, the vendor is aware of the fact that there is 
no guarantee that the policy will continue to be profitable.  The company states in their 
website: “So far, we've let people name their price …” and emphasizes that “We may, 
without prior notice, change the Service; stop providing the Service or features of the 
Service …”  Consumers understand the fragility of the system and on various social media 
sites, these consumers encourage each other to pay Humble Bundles enough to “help keep it 
going” in addition to allocating payment to developers and charity (information retrieved 
from the Humble Bundle website on June 16, 2014). The Humble Bundles can thus be seen 
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as an especially characteristic example of independent creators selling via PWYW under the 
six contextual features, as per the previous discussion on independent artists. 
(d) Churches in the congregational tradition. These are autonomous and typically Protestant 
Christian churches that function self-sufficiently based on members’ donations; the donations 
are solicited regularly in an essentially PWYW fashion. Thus, in a general sense, a 
congregational church, as a provider of religious service and community support, is 
analogous to the seller, while its members are analogous to the consumers, in our model. 
There are obviously repeated interactions (feature (1)), and it can be inferred from the 
church’s continued existence that its survival has not posed an unreasonably high financial 
threshold to its members (feature (2)). The members would also likely be very forward 
looking regarding the continued existence of their church (feature (3)). If the church would 
have to be discontinued, the “fixed price” consequence for its members would be to find and 
assimilate into another church that is possibly of a different denomination and has different 
community networks; for many members, such a price would be highly deterring (feature 
(4)). It can also be safely assumed that a congregational church that has long been in 
existence must have loyal members who regard their church highly and derive much value 
from it (feature (5)). Lastly, church members would typically communicate with each other 
closely and regularly (feature (6)). Hence congregational churches do typically exemplify the 
features for continuous PWYW outlined above. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our experiments were carried out with each “market” consisting of only eight consumers. 
Laboratory conditions do not allow us to conduct experiments with group sizes that approximate 
naturally occurring markets.  It would therefore be important to conduct field experiments in the 
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future to see if the insights we gain from our experiment generalize to larger markets.  More 
crucially, our idea of increasing consumers’ incentive to pay (in fact, incentivizing even the most 
“selfish” consumers to pay) by communicating a credible threat has not been tested in the field. 
Consumers may also derive procedural utility from PWYW pricing and may wish to 
encourage the seller to continue using PWYW by paying sufficiently high prices to sustain 
PWYW.  For example, in a one-week PWYW campaign in 2009 conducted by 2D Boy for its 
“World of Goo” game, 37% of the consumers (out of 12,643) who responded to a survey after 
downloading the game selected “I like the pay-what-you-want model and wanted to support it” 
as a reason for paying their chosen price.10 Future research might take these factors into account 
to enrich the theorizing and practical applicability of PWYW pricing. 
Extensions could also incorporate competition, according to which every competing 
seller can decide between PWYW and fixed pricing in repeated interactions (see Schmidt et al., 
2014, for a related duopolistic experiment). Lastly, we might consider a highly stochastic market 
environment in which consumer tastes and outside options change from period to period.  In 
these scenarios, we still expect that equilibria with profitable PWYW could exist under some 
range of parameters. However, coordination issues remain, and experiments on these extensions 
could yield insights into how PWYW could be sustained in complex business environments. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Keep_Wikipedia_Free (retrieved June 16, 2014) 
2 A relevant example here is Humble Bundles (see the Managerial Implications section). 
3 It is not essential for the distribution of ui s in the population to be known to all 
consumers. As we shall show, to attain an efficient equilibrium, each consumer only needs to 
know how much he/she needs to pay under PWYW, and practically nothing else.  
4 Obviously, in the interest of parsimony, our model ignores several possible complexities, 
such as the charging of different fees for different pages, per use fees, consumer uncertainty 
about the veracity of the prospective fixed fee, and how permanent that fixed fee might be, 
unstable consumer preferences (different utilities at different time) and the like. 
5 Technically, this is the characteristic of Markov perfect equilibria (Maskin & Tirole, 
1988). 
6 In additional sessions not reported here in detail, we experimented on the same setup as 
in Experiment 1 but with a threshold of 680 tokens, which was higher than the theoretical 
maximum of 619.2 tokens at which PWYW equilibria are still feasible. As expected, PWYW 
was not sustainable in those sessions even with chat and regardless of framing. At the other 
extreme, we also experimented on a setup with a threshold of zero token (i.e., the seller 
continued to offer PWYW unconditionally); we found that, in those sessions, subjects rarely paid 
the seller, even with chat and under rich framing. These latter results indicate that paying 
behavior that was driven by fairness or altruistic motives towards the seller was not important in 
our laboratory setting. In the interest of brevity, we do not discuss these additional sessions in the 
paper. Our results are obtainable upon request. 
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7 We ran a pilot session with unlimited chat allowed throughout the experiment. The 
results were similar to the chat condition reported here, but it took subjects almost three hours to 
finish the session. Therefore, for practical reasons, we chose a limited duration structure for our 
main experiment. The allowed duration for chat before each game was: (1) Practice Game to 
Game 6: 3 minutes; (2) Game 7 to Game 13: 2 minutes; (3) Game 14 to Game 20: 1 minute.     
8 Consistently, analysis on the effect of market information controlling for feedback 
shows that, given full feedback, Type Y players paid marginally less to S under PWYW when 
they had full, relative to no, market information (p = .05) while Type Z players paid significantly 
more (p < .01); on the other hand, given partial feedback, Type Y players paid significantly more 
with full compared with no market information, while Type Z players paid significantly less 
(both at p < .01). That is, the full market information conditions lay “mid-way” between the 
other two conditions in terms of individual payments. 
9 This “fan base” need not be very large for profitable application of our proposed pricing 
policy.  For example, musician Matthew Ebel said that he makes 26.3% of his net income from 
just 40 hard-core fans (http://www.musicthinktank.com/blog/in-defense-of-1000-true-fans-part-
ii-matthew-ebel.html, retrieved June 16, 2014) which is consistent with Kevin Kelly's theory that 
to be a success as a content creator, you just need 1,000 “true fans”. 
(http://www.kk.org/thetechnium/archives/2008/03/1000_true_fans.php, retrieved June 16, 2014). 
10 We thank Ron Carmel and Kyle Gabler, the 2D Boy team, for sharing the survey data 
with us. 
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Table 1 
Players’ valuations in tokens in the experiments. 
  
 
Seller offering conditional PWYW 
(“Playa” in rich frame, 
“S” in neutral frame) 
 
 
Outside option 
(“Quello” in rich frame, 
“R” in neutral frame) 
 
“Fan of Playa”  
or “Type Y” 
(two players) 
 201 0 
 
“Casual Listener”  
or “Type Z”  
(six players) 
 49 49 
 
Note. Other parameters that were common in all conditions include: per-round discount 
factor = δ = .9; threshold for PWYW continuation = π = 400 tokens; fixed price of the 
outside option = 48 tokens; the fixed pricing regime of Playa/ S had p =200 tokens. 
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Table 2 
Mean payments in PWYW rounds to focal seller S and the mean number of rounds with sustained 
PWYW in Experiment 1, by coordination mechanism manipulation.  
 
  
Mean payment to S in tokens  
in a PWYW round (SD) 
 
Mean no. of rounds  
in session (SD)  
Coordination 
mechanism 
 Type Y Player Type Z Player 
 
played 
with sustained 
PWYW 
No mechanism 
(control) 
 82.82 (86.34) 20.79 (55.91) 
 
191.50 (4.87) 10.50 (9.96) 
Chat  160.76 (21.08) 12.28 (3.29) 
 
193.00 (5.15) 167.50 (18.24) 
Suggestion  136.85 (65.23) 11.67 (14.80) 
 
191.88 (4.67) 35.88 (37.95) 
 
 
Note. The standard deviations of the PWYW payment entries are calculated with the payment to 
S in each PWYW round by each player of the relevant type as the unit of observation. The 
standard deviations of the number of rounds played/with sustained PWYW are calculated with 
group as the unit of observation. Data across framing manipulations have been aggregated. 
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Table 3 
Mean payments in PWYW rounds to focal seller S and the mean number of rounds with sustained 
PWYW in Experiment 2, by condition.  
 
 
  
Mean payment to S in tokens  
in a PWYW round (SD) 
 
Mean no. of rounds  
in session (SD)  
 
 
Feedback 
Market 
information 
 Type Y Player Type Z Player 
 
played 
with sustained 
PWYW 
Full 
Full  157.26 (37.79) 15.29 (16.41) 
 
189.80 (1.64) 139.00 (31.91) 
No  164.01 (13.98) 12.35 (5.32) 
 
192.60 (8.32) 152.40 (29.31) 
Partial 
Full  159.52 (16.67) 14.62 (7.55) 
 
194.00 (7.48) 133.20 (60.85) 
No  148.87 (34.43) 20.95 (23.01) 
 
190.60 (4.16) 93.80 (50.69) 
 
 
Note. The standard deviations of the PWYW payment entries are calculated with the payment to 
S in each PWYW round by each player of the relevant type as the unit of observation. The 
standard deviations of the number of rounds played/with sustained PWYW are calculated with 
group as the unit of observation.  
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Figure 1. Sequence of decisions in each round in the experiments. 
 
Fixed price p PWYW 
Buy from S 
at price p 
Make no 
purchase 
Buy 
outside 
option
Buy from S 
at price of 
choice 
Make no 
purchase 
Buy 
outside 
option 
Seller S’s
pricing policy announced 
Each player decides whether to Each player decides whether to
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Figure 2. Mean number of rounds with sustained PWYW by length of game (i.e., total number of 
rounds in the game) and coordination mechanism manipulation: Experiment 1.  
 
Note. Data across framing manipulations have been aggregated.  
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Figure 3. Mean number of rounds with sustained PWYW by length of game (i.e., total number of 
rounds in the game) and condition: Experiment 2.  
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Appendix 
Experimental Instructions for Experiment 1, Chat Conditions 
Neutral Frame Rich Frame 
INSTRUCTIONS 
THE ONLINE MUSIC GAME 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
In this study you will make many decisions.  Your payment at the end of the study will depend 
on your own decisions as well as the decisions of others you play with. 
 
During this study you will play the same game 20 times, and each game will consist of a 
number of rounds. 
 
Description of the Game 
 
The game is played by 8 players. 
 
 
 
 
In each round, a player can choose one of 
three options: option S or option R or option 
N. 
 
 
The game is played by 8 players.  Two bands, 
the Playa band and the Quello band, upload a 
new song to their site every round of the game 
and allow people to listen to it online. 
 
In each round, a player can either listen to a 
Playa song or to a Quello song or to none. 
 
Types of Players 
 
There are two types of players, who differ in 
how much they value each option. 
 
1. Type Y players – To these players, option 
S is equivalent to gaining 201 tokens (the 
experimental currency used in this study 
that will be later converted to real money); 
but options R and N are equivalent to 
gaining nothing i.e. 0 token. 
 
 
2. Type Z players – To these players, 
options S and R are equivalent to gaining 
49 tokens, but option N is equivalent to 
gaining nothing i.e. 0 token. 
 
There are two types of players, who differ in 
how much they like each band. 
 
1. Fans of Playa – these people love Playa’s 
music but not Quello’s.  To them, listening 
to a Playa song is equivalent to gaining 
201 tokens (the experimental currency 
used in this study that will be later 
converted to real money); but listening to a 
Quello song is worth nothing to them, and 
is in fact equivalent to gaining 0 token. 
 
2. Casual Listeners – these people like 
listening to music in general but do not 
prefer one band over the other.  Listening 
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To sum up: 
 
Type of 
player 
Gain from selecting one option 
S R N 
Y 
201 
tokens 
0 token 0 token 
Z 49 tokens 
49 
tokens 
0 token 
 
Of the 8 players in the game, two are of Type 
Y and six are of Type Z 
 
to any song – be it Playa or Quello – 
means the same to them, and is always 
equivalent to gaining 49 tokens. 
 
To sum up: 
 
Type of 
player 
Gain from listening to a 
song of 
Playa Quello 
Fan of Playa 201 tokens 0 token 
Casual 
Listener 
49 tokens 49 tokens 
 
Of the 8 players in the game, two are Fans of 
Playa and six are Casual Listeners. 
 
 
We will assign these roles to you and the other players before each game begins.  Every 
player’s role will be fixed in all the rounds of the same game, but will be re-assigned from game 
to game. 
 
 
Each player will be of Type Y in 5 games and 
Type Z in 15 games. 
 
 
Each player will be a Fan of Playa in 5 games 
and a Casual Listener in 15 games. 
Payment 
 
To choose an option, you may need to pay.  
Different options have different payment 
schemes: 
• The payment scheme for option S.  In the 
first round of every game, anyone who 
chooses S can pay as he/she wishes.  In 
other words, if you choose S you may pay 
nothing (0 token), or you may pay any 
number of tokens you wish; it is entirely 
up to you how much you pay for S. 
However, this scheme of “pay as you 
wish” for S will continue to the next round 
only if the total payment for S from all 
those who have chosen S in this round is at 
least 400 tokens; otherwise, S will cost 
200 tokens in all future rounds of the 
game. 
In general, as long as the total payment 
 
To listen to a song, you may need to pay.  The 
two bands have different payment schemes: 
• Playa payment scheme.  In the first round 
of every game, Playa allows every listener 
to pay as he/she wishes.  In other words, if 
you listen to a Playa song you may pay 
nothing (0 token), or you may pay any 
number of tokens you wish; it is entirely 
up to you how much you pay Playa for its 
song. 
However, Playa will continue to carry out 
this “pay as you wish” scheme only if it 
receives at least 400 tokens from all those 
who have listened to the Playa song in this 
round; otherwise, it will charge a fixed fee 
of 200 tokens per song in all future rounds 
of the game. 
In general, Playa’s management decides 
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for S is at least 400 tokens in a round, 
the payment for selecting S will continue 
to be “pay as you wish”; but once the 
total payment for S in a round is less 
than 400 tokens, the payment scheme 
for S will change and S will cost 200 
tokens per round in all future rounds of 
the game. 
 
 
 
• The payment scheme for option R. You 
pay 48 tokens to choose R in a round, and 
this is the same in all rounds. 
 
• The payment scheme for option N. You 
pay nothing i.e. 0 token to choose N in a 
round, and this is the same in all rounds. 
 
that, as long as the total payment that 
Playa receives from its listener(s) is at 
least 400 tokens in a round, Playa will 
continue to allow every listener to pay as 
he/she wishes; but once Playa receives 
less than 400 tokens in a round, it will 
change its payment scheme and will 
charge every listener a fixed fee of 200 
tokens per round in all future rounds of 
the game. 
 
• Quello payment scheme. Quello always 
charges a fixed fee of 48 tokens per song 
per round. 
 
How much does a player earn from choosing 
an option in a round? 
How much does a player earn from listening 
to a song in a round? 
 
Your (and every other player’s) earnings from 
choosing an option in a round are calculated as 
follows: 
 
Earnings from choosing an option 
= Gain from choosing the option – payment 
 
Choosing R 
 
If a Type Z player chooses R in a round, 
he/she gains 49 tokens, but has to pay 48 
tokens.  Thus his/her earnings in that round are 
equal to: 
 
 
Earnings = 49 tokens – 48 tokens = 1 token. 
 
So a Type Z player earns 1 token for choosing 
R in a round. 
 
If a Type Y player chooses R in a round, 
he/she gains 0 token, but has to pay 48 tokens.  
Thus his/her earnings in that round are equal 
to: 
 
Your (and every other player’s) earnings from 
listening to a song in a round are calculated as 
follows: 
 
Earnings from listening to a song 
= Gain from listening to the song – payment 
 
Listening to a Quello song 
 
If a Casual Listener listens to a Quello song in 
a round, he/she gains 49 tokens from listening 
to the song, but has to pay 48 tokens for the 
song.  Thus his/her earnings in that round are 
equal to: 
 
Earnings = 49 tokens – 48 tokens = 1 token. 
 
So a Casual Listener earns 1 token for 
listening to a Quello song in a round. 
 
If a Fan of Playa listens to a Quello song in a 
round, he/she gains 0 token from listening to 
the song, but has to pay 48 tokens for the 
song.  Thus his/her earnings in that round are 
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Earnings = 0 token – 48 tokens = -48 tokens. 
 
So a Type Y player loses 48 tokens for 
choosing R in a round. 
 
To sum up: 
 
Type of player Earnings from choosing R 
Y -48 tokens 
Z 1 token 
 
Choosing S 
 
If a player chooses S in a round, and if S has a 
fixed cost of 200 tokens in that round, the 
calculation of earnings is similar to that for 
choosing R, but with a cost of 200 tokens 
instead of 48 tokens.  But if the payment 
scheme for S is “pay as you wish” in that 
round, the payment and thus earnings of a 
player may vary from player to player 
depending on how much (if at all) each player 
pays.  To sum up: 
 
 
Type of 
player 
Earnings from 
choosing S in a 
round under 
“pay as you 
wish” 
(supposing 
player pays m 
tokens) 
Earnings 
from 
choosing S in 
a round 
under fixed 
cost 
(of 200 
tokens per 
round) 
Y 
(201 – m) 
tokens 
(201-200) = 1 
token 
Z (49 – m) tokens 
(49-200) = -
151 tokens 
 
 
 
If a player chooses option N in a round, 
equal to: 
 
Earnings = 0 token – 48 tokens = -48 tokens. 
 
So a Fan of Playa loses 48 tokens for listening 
to a Quello song in a round. 
 
To sum up: 
 
 
Earnings from listening to 
a Quello song 
Fan of Playa -48 tokens 
Casual 
Listener 
1 token 
 
Listening to a Playa song 
 
If a player listens to a Playa song in a round, 
and if Playa charges a fixed fee of 200 tokens 
in that round, the calculation of earnings is 
similar to that for listening to a Quello song, 
but with a payment of 200 tokens instead of 48 
tokens.  But if Playa allows every listener to 
pay as he/she wishes in that round, the 
payment and thus earnings of a player may 
vary from player to player depending on how 
much (if at all) each player pays.  To sum up: 
 
 
Earnings from 
listening to a 
Playa song in 
a round under 
“pay as you 
wish” 
(supposing 
player pays m 
tokens) 
Earnings 
from 
listening to a 
Playa song 
in a round 
under fixed 
fee 
(of 200 
tokens per 
round) 
Fan of 
Playa 
(201 – m) 
tokens 
(201-200) = 
1 token 
Casual 
Listener 
(49 – m) 
tokens 
(49-200) = -
151 tokens 
 
If a player does not listen to any song in a 
round, his/her earnings in that round is 0 
token. 
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his/her earnings in that round is 0 token. 
 
How does the game continue after a round is finished? 
 
A round is finished when all players have made their decisions for that round.  After that, the 
computer will randomly select whether the game will end or whether it will proceed to the next 
round.  After each round, there is a 90% chance that the game will continue to the next round 
and a 10% chance that the game will end immediately. 
 
The chat forum 
 
Before each game, there is a chat forum with limited duration through which players in the 
same group can send messages to each other.  You are allowed to:  
1. chat 3 minutes before each game in Games 1 to 6, 
2. chat 2 minutes before each game in Games 7 to 13, and 
3. chat 1 minute before each game in Games 14 to 20. 
1.  
Procedures 
 
You will enter all your decisions via the 
computer terminal in front of you. 
 
As each game begins, you will see on the 
computer screen whether you have been 
randomly assigned to be a Type Y or a Type Z 
player.  Remember that: (1) there are two 
Type Y players and six Type Z players in 
every game; (2) every player’s role (Type 
Y/Type Z) will be fixed in all the rounds of 
the same game, but will be re-assigned from 
game to game; and (3) each player will be of 
Type Y in 5 games and Type Z in 15 games. 
 
 
At the beginning of each round, you will see a 
Decision Screen such as Decision Screens (1) 
to (4) (Please refer to the handout on your 
desk labeled “Decision Screens”.) 
 
A Decision Screen lists the following from top 
to bottom: 
• Whether you are a Type Y or a Type Z 
player. 
• The number of the current game and 
 
You will enter all your decisions via the 
computer terminal in front of you. 
 
As each game begins, you will see on the 
computer screen whether you have been 
randomly assigned to be a Fan of Playa or a 
Casual Listener.  Remember that: (1) there are 
two Fans of Playa and six Casual Listeners in 
every game; (2) every player’s role (Fan of 
Playa/Casual Listener) will be fixed in all the 
rounds of the same game, but will be re-
assigned from game to game; and (3) each 
player will be a Fan of Playa in 5 games and a 
Casual Listener in 15 games. 
 
At the beginning of each round, you will see a 
Decision Screen such as Decision Screens (1) 
to (4) (Please refer to the handout on your 
desk labeled “Decision Screens”.) 
 
A Decision Screen lists the following from top 
to bottom: 
• Whether you are a Fan of Playa or a 
Casual Listener. 
• The number of the current game and 
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current round. 
• The payment scheme of S, R and N in the 
current round. 
• Three buttons that correspond to the 
decisions you can make in that round, i.e. 
(from left to right) (1) choose S; (2) 
choose N; (3) choose R. 
• Under each button, you will see a column 
of numbers that include: 
(i) Your gain in tokens if you choose the 
option labeled on the button; 
(ii) The cost you would have to pay for 
your decision, except if your decision 
is to choose S under “pay as you 
wish” (see (iv)); 
(iii) Your earnings as a result of your 
decision, except if your decision is to 
choose S under “pay as you wish” 
(see (iv)); 
(iv) If the payment scheme for S is of 
“pay as you wish” in the current 
round, then, in the space under the 
“S” button where the cost would be 
stated for other decisions, there is a 
blank.  You may enter in the blank 
any potential payment that you are 
considering.  After that, you may 
click the “Calculate” button to 
calculate your earnings from 
choosing S with that payment.  You 
may repeat this process for as many 
potential payments as you like.  
 
 
 
To make a decision, click the button labeled 
with your choice – except that if the payment 
scheme for S is “pay as you wish” in the 
current round, and you decide to choose S, 
you will need to: (1) enter your payment in the 
blank space under the “S” button, (2) click the 
“Calculate” button to see what your earnings 
will be, and (3) click the “S” button. 
 
 
Players choose options simultaneously.  After 
current round. 
• The payment scheme of Playa and Quello 
in the current round. 
• Three buttons that correspond to the 
decisions you can make in that round, i.e. 
(from left to right) (1) listen to a Playa 
song; (2) listen to no song; (3) listen to a 
Quello song. 
• Under each button, you will see a column 
of numbers that include: 
(v) Your gain in tokens if your decision 
is as labeled on the button; 
(vi) The fee that you would have to pay 
for your decision, except if your 
decision is to listen to a Playa song 
under “pay as you wish” (see (iv)); 
(vii) Your earnings as a result of your 
decision, except if your decision is to 
listen to a Playa song under “pay as 
you wish” (see (iv)); 
(viii) If Playa allows every listener to pay 
as he/she wishes in the current round, 
then, in the space under the “Playa” 
button where the fee would be stated 
for other decisions, there is a blank.  
You may enter in the blank any 
potential payment that you are 
considering.  After that, you may 
click the “Calculate” button to 
calculate your earnings from 
listening to a Playa song with that 
payment.  You may repeat this 
process for as many potential 
payments as you like.  
 
To make a decision, click the button labeled 
with your choice – except that, if Playa allows 
every listener to pay as he/she wishes in the 
current round, and you decide to listen to a 
Playa song, you will need to: (1) enter your 
payment in the blank space under the “Playa” 
button, (2) click the “Calculate” button to see 
what your earnings will be, and (3) click the 
“Playa” button. 
 
Players make listening decisions 
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all players have made decisions in a round, a 
feedback screen will appear that shows: (1) 
every player’s decision (S/R/N), payment, and 
earnings in that round; (2) the total payment 
for each option in that round.  If the payment 
scheme for S is “pay as you wish” in the 
current round, the feedback screen will also 
show: (a) whether the total payment for S 
reaches 400 tokens; and (b) whether the “pay 
as you wish” payment scheme for S will 
continue in the next round of the game, or will 
change to a fixed cost in all future rounds of 
the game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
simultaneously and without communication 
with each other.  After all players have made 
decisions in a round, a feedback screen will 
appear that shows: (1) every player’s decision 
(Playa/Quello/Neither), payment, and earnings 
in that round; (2) the total payment received 
by each band in that round.  If Playa allows 
every listener to pay as he/she wishes in the 
current round, the feedback screen will also 
show: (a) whether the total payment received 
by Playa reaches 400 tokens; and (b) whether 
Playa will continue to allow every listener to 
pay as he/she wishes in the next round of the 
game, or will charge a fixed fee in all future 
rounds of the game. 
 
Afterwards, the computer will select whether the game will proceed to the next round or will 
end.  Remember that there is a 90% chance that the game will proceed to the next round, and a 
10% chance that it will end. 
 
Once a game is ended, the next game will begin – unless you have already come to the last 
(20th) game, after which the study will be finished. 
 
You will play 20 games with the same group of 8 players (including yourself). 
 
Payment 
 
After all 20 games are finished, we will choose 5 games at random and pay you your total 
earnings from all the rounds in those games at a rate of HK$1 = 10 tokens. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and the study coordinator will come to speak to you. 
 
If you wish to participate in this study, please sign the consent form.  Afterwards, when you are 
ready to start, please click the “START” button on the screen.  You will then begin to play 1 
practice game to familiarize yourself with the study; the practice game will not be chosen for 
calculation of your final payment.  After the practice game is finished, you will play the 20 
games of the study. 
 
Please wait patiently until all other players are ready to start. 
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Decision Screens (supplementary handout to the experimental instructions) 
 
(1) A Type Y player’s Decision Screen when the payment scheme for S is “pay as you wish” 
 
 
(2) A Type Y player’s Decision Screen when S has a fixed cost 
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(3) A Type Z player’s Decision Screen when the payment scheme for S is “pay as you wish” 
 
 
(4) A Type Z player’s Decision Screen when S has a fixed cost 
 
